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Abstract
This paper analyzes the investment behavior of …rms under a quan-
tity constraint on the amount of external funds which can be raised at
a given cost (credit constraints). In this world, investment-cash ‡ow
sensitivities decrease in the degree of credit constraints, until a …rm
becomes e¤ectively unconstrained. This generates a “U-shaped” curve
for the relationship between sensitivities and credit constraints. From
an empirical perspective, the good news is that we suggest a theoret-
ically consistent way to identify the impact of …nancial constraints on
investment behavior, at least under the condition that …nancial con-
straints a¤ect primarily the quantity of credit available to …rms. The
bad news is that our prediction is in a sense the opposite as the one
explored in previous empirical literature.
1 Introduction
There is a large …nance and macroeconomics literature1, starting with Faz-
zari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), which looks for evidence of …nancial con-
straints by examining the sensitivity of investment to changes in cash ‡ow.
¤New York University, Stern School of Business. Email: halmeida@stern.nyu.edu
1Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995, Hoshi et.al, 1991, Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992,
Hubbard et.al, 1995, Kashyap et.al, 1994, Lamont, 1997, Oliner and Rudesbusch, 1992,
Schaller, 1993 and Whited, 1992 are only some of the other references on this large lit-
erature. See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996 and Hubbard 1998 for comprehensive
surveys.
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The basic idea behind these empirical exercises is that the sensitivity of in-
vestment to cash ‡ow should be higher for …rms which are more …nancially
constrained (the monotonicity hypothesis). Therefore, we should be able to
identify the presence of …nancial constraints by looking at cross-sectional dif-
ferences in investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharfstein (1991) classify Japanese …rms according to membership in a
Japanese industrial group (Keiretsu), and …nd that Keiretsu …rms have lower
investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. They interpret the result as evidence that
Keiretsu …rms are less …nancially constrained than the other …rms in the
Japanese economy.
The validity of such empirical exercises have been criticized by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997). The basic problem is that the monotonicity hypothesis
is not a necessary implication of a …rm’s optimal investment decisions under
…nancial constraints, as they argue. Therefore, we cannot conclude that
cross-sectional di¤erences in investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are evidence
of …nancial constraints. For example, the results in Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1991), cannot be interpreted as evidence that Keiretsu …rms are
more …nancially constrained than non-Keiretsu ones. Moreover, there has
been recent empirical work where the authors (Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
and Cleary (1999), more speci…cally) argue that, in their particular samples,
more constrained …rms are actually less sensitive to changes in cash ‡ow.
These recent papers have created a debate in the literature, particularly
between Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000), and Kaplan and Zingales
(2000). On the theoretical front, FHP attempt to provide conditions under
which investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are indeed monotonic in …nancial
constraints. However, KZ show that the FHP condition is still not su¢cient
to ensure that investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities should bear any precise re-
lationship at all with …nancial constraints. In our view, the conclusions to
derive from this debate are mostly negative. Although we know that …nancial
constraints should in‡uence investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities, we cannot be
sure about the precise theoretical relationship. Thus, cross-sectional di¤er-
ences in investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities cannot be used per se as evidence
of …nancial constraints.
The current paper brings several contributions to this recent debate. Our
most important contribution is to suggest a speci…c scenario where we can
make precise inferences about the nature of the relationship between …nan-
cial constraints and investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. This happens when
…nancial constraints translate into a quantity constraint on the amount of
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external funds which can be raised at a given cost (credit constraint). The
credit constraint is endogenous, in the sense that the credit limit depends
on the value of the …rm’s assets. In this world less constrained …rms are the
ones which can borrow a higher fraction of the value of their assets.
In such a world, we get precise implications for investment - cash ‡ow
sensitivities. However, the implication is not that investment-cash ‡ow sen-
sitivities increase in the degree of …nancial constraints. The implication of
the model is that sensitivities should decrease with …nancial constraints, as
long as …rms are not entirely unconstrained. We get therefore a “U-shaped”
curve for the relationship between sensitivities and the measure of …nancial
constraints.
The intuition for this result is simple. A change in cash ‡ow (¢W ) has a
direct e¤ect on the investment of …nancially constrained …rms. Constrained
…rms invest all their funds, and therefore the impact of this direct e¤ect is
the same for all constrained …rms (and equal to ¢W ): However, there is
also an indirect e¤ect which is due to the endogenous change in borrowing
capacity. For any change in investment ¢I; borrowing capacity changes by
a certain fraction for all …rms. However, this change in borrowing capacity
will be higher for the …rms which can borrow a higher fraction of the value
of their assets (the less constrained ones). In other words, not only can a less
constrained …rm borrow more, but its debt capacity is also more sensitive
to a change in cash ‡ow. It is this indirect ampli…cation e¤ect which drives
the di¤erences in investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities in our model. Naturally,
if borrowing capacity is so large that …rms are unconstrained, sensitivities
go back to zero. This gives us the U-shaped relationship between …nancial
constraints and investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities.
From an empirical perspective, our analysis brings both positive and neg-
ative contributions. The positive one is that we suggest a theoretically con-
sistent way to identify the impact of …nancial constraints on investment be-
havior, at least under certain conditions. If if …nancial constraints a¤ect
primarily credit constraints on …rms, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are
useful measures of …nancial constraints. The bad news is that our prediction
about the relationship between …nancial constraints and sensitivities is the
opposite as the one explored in previous empirical literature. Thus, our re-
sults cannot be used to rescue the investment-cash ‡ow literature from the
Kaplan and Zingales critique.
One paper which directly uses the empirical approach suggested by this
paper (although in a slightly di¤erent context), is Almeida (2000). One
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good example of the particular …nancing and investment decisions described
here is on housing …nance contracts. The availability of mortgage credit to
households is usually limited to a speci…c fraction of the value of the house
being purchased (the maximum loan-to-value, or LTV ratio), which is used
as collateral. That is, credit rationing seems to be a crucial feature of such
contracts. Furthermore, housing …nance development di¤ers widely across
the world, and this has a direct e¤ect on observed maximum LTV ratios
in di¤erent countries. Almeida (2000) looks at the international data, and
shows that house prices are more sensitive to shocks which a¤ect household
income, in countries where household …nance is more developed. This is
evidence that relaxation of credit constraints does tend to increase the extent
to which investment and prices respond to shocks to net worth.
Our results also suggest interesting policy implications. Basically, they
suggest that …nancial development may lead to higher ‡uctuations in in-
vestment (and prices). Even if …nancial development is desirable for other
reasons, the potential associated increase in the extent of ‡uctuations could
become an explicit policy concern. This is in stark contrast to the policy im-
plications which arise from papers like Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988),
which in a broad sense imply that …nancial development should reduce the
extent of ‡uctuations in investment.
An important question raised by our results is why are they di¤erent than
the ambiguous results which obtain in KZ. A key assumption in KZ is that
…rms can always raise external funds if they pay the right price. Financial
constraints in this world translate entirely into higher costs of external funds
(and costs which are more sensitive to changes in the amount of external
funds). However, there is no credit rationing. In other words, while KZ
focus on the e¤ects of capital market imperfections on the cost of external
funds, our focus is on quantities, and liquidity constraints.
In KZ, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities depend on how …nancial con-
straints a¤ect the slopes of marginal costs of external funds, and the slope of
the marginal productivity of investment. The reason why our results are so
strong is because none of the e¤ects which drive sensitivities in the Kaplan
and Zingales model matter in our model. First of all, the slope of marginal
costs of external funds is the same, in equilibrium, for all …rms. In equilib-
rium, all constrained …rms are at the point at which the supply of capital
becomes inelastic (since they are credit-constrained). Therefore, the e¤ects
related to changes in the slope of marginal costs do not matter. Furthermore,
in any constrained equilibrium, the slope of the capital demand curve does
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not matter, since it is not equal on the margin to the slope of the capital sup-
ply curve (which is equal to the slope of marginal costs of external funds).
Thus, this slope does not in‡uence investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. On
the other hand, the indirect ampli…cation e¤ect described above is present
whenever there are liquidity constraints, and when borrowing capacity is
endogenous.
This suggests that it is crucial to determine if …nancial constraints a¤ect
primarily credit constraints on …rms (that is, the availability of …nance at
a given cost), or the cost of external …nance to di¤erent …rms. We explore
this idea further, by considering a scenario where both credit constraints,
and deadweight costs of external …nance in‡uence investment and …nancing
decisions. The world we describe is a world in which there is a “pecking order”
in the use of external …nance. Firms exhaust their collateralized debt capacity
…rst (rationed funds), because it is the cheapest way they can raise external
funds. Then, they raise the balance at higher costs. Both the amount they
can raise at the cheaper price, and the marginal costs of increasing funds
above this limit, are a¤ected by the degree of …nancial constraints.
It is no longer the case that investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities have the
“U-shape” described above because we bring back the e¤ects of changes in the
cost of non-rationed funds into the picture. The ‡ip side from this condition
is also true. Once we introduce credit constraints in a model such as Kaplan
and Zingales’, we automatically get an e¤ect which pushes towards higher
sensitivities for less constrained …rms. This makes it even harder to obtain
conditions under which the monotonicity hypothesis should hold.
We start in section 2, by introducing a model where there are credit
constraints on …rms. We derive implications for investment-cash ‡ow sen-
sitivities. We also compare the implications to those of previous literature.
In section 3 we introduce a general model where both credit constraints and
changes in the marginal costs of external funds are important. The empirical
and policy implications of the theoretical analysis are discussed in detail in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The basic model2
Assume that …rms have production technologies f(I); which produce output
from an amount of physical investment equal to I: However, following Hart
and Moore (1994), production only occurs if managers input their human
capital into production. Also, human capital is inalienable, in the sense that
managers cannot commit to input their human capital ex-ante. Depending
on the amount of debt they have outstanding; entrepreneurs may then decide
to renege on their debt and renegotiate with their creditors (the lenders). The
contractual outcome in this framework is that lenders will only lend up to
the value of the …rm’s collateralizable assets. If V is the value of the …rm’s
collateralizable assets, the borrowing constraint is:
B · V
where B is the amount of collateralized debt raised by …rms. In order to
derive V; assume that the physical goods invested by the …rm have a current
price3 equal to 1 (a normalization), and a price next period (the period when
output is produced) equal to q1:
We also assume that liquidation of the …rm’s physical assets I by lenders
entails transaction costs that are proportional to the value of the physical
collateral held by entrepreneurs. More speci…cally, if the …rm’s assets I are
seized by lenders, a fraction ¿ 2 (0; 1) of the proceeds q1I is lost. An increase
in ¿ will then decrease the liquidity of collateral4. Thus, the total liquidation
value of the assets is (1¡ ¿ )q1I:
The parameter ¿ is a simple way to measure the degree of capital market
imperfections in this world. Firms with low ¿ are able to borrowmore because
they have assets which are (potentially) worth more for outside creditors. The
2The model we describe here draws heavily on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and on
Almeida (1999).
3The current period should be interpreted as the period when investment is made.
4The parameter ¿ is a function of factors such as the tangibility of the …rm’s physical
assets, and the legal environment that dictates the relations between debtors and creditors.
Myers and Rajan (1998) parametrize the liquidity …rm’s assets in a similar way.
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borrowing constraint will then be5:
B · (1¡ ¿ )q1I
Managers will then choose investment and debt in order to maximize the
value of their equity on the …rm (there is no outside equity in this model).
If we assume that the discount rate is equal to 1; this implies the following
program:
max (c0 + c1) s:t:
c0 = W ¡ I +B ¸ 0
c1 = f(I) + q1I ¡B
B · (1¡ ¿)q1I
Notice that, if there was no borrowing constraint on …rms (third con-
straint not binding), this problem would reduce to:
max
I
f(I) + q1I ¡ I
if we let:
F (I) = f(I) + q1I
The interpretation is that, in the present model, …rms can invest at the
opportunity cost of internal funds, as long as the amount they have to borrow
does not exceed a certain amount given by the value of their collateralizable
assets. Financial market imperfections a¤ect not the cost of external funds,
but the quantity that can be raised at a given price.
The solution to the …rm’s optimal investment depends on whether the
borrowing constraint is binding or not. If the borrowing constraint is not
binding, we obtain the e¢cient level of investment:
F
0
(IFB) = 1
5We are assuming that …rms cannot pledge future cash ‡ows directly to creditors. In
terms of the Hart and Moore model, we are implicitly assuming that …rm managers can
make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to outside creditors, if they are both bargaining for current
cash ‡ows. Nothing in the analysis will change if we assume that creditors get a …xed
fraction of the proceeds in the bargaining process, as long as this fraction is not correlated
with the degree of capital market imperfections. See Almeida (1999) for an analysis of
the case where the degree of capital market imperfections also a¤ects the fraction of cash
‡ows that can be pledged.
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If the amount of internal funds …rms have is high enough, then the e¢cient
level of investment will obtain. The same is true if ¿ is low enough. All we
need is that the amount of internal funds plus the amount that can be raised
in the market is enough to …nance the e¢cient level of investment, that is:
W + (1¡ ¿ )q1IFB ¸ IFB
For a givenW; this equation determines the minimum value of ¿ which will
lead to a constrained solution, and vice-versa. Investment will be constrained
as long as:
¿ ¸ ¿min = 1¡ I
FB ¡W
q1IFB
W · Wmax = (1¡ q1 + ¿q1)IFB
Thus, the level of investment will be given by:
I(¿ ;W ) =
W
(1¡ q1 + ¿q1) ; if ¿ ¸ ¿min and W ·Wmax (1)
= IFB; otherwise
Figure 1 depicts the determination of the optimal investment level in this
model. Notice that everything works as if the …rm had an in…nitely elastic
supply of funds (at the right cost) until the equilibrium investment level
I(¿ ;W ); but a completely inelastic supply of funds after that. Constrained
equilibrium investment is determined at the point where the function W
I
+
(1¡ ¿ )q1 is equal to the opportunity cost of investment.
The investment cash-‡ow sensitivity in this model is given by:
@I
@W
(W; k) =
1
(1¡ q1 + ¿q1) if ¿ ¸ ¿min and W · Wmax (2)
= 0; otherwise
Thus, as long as …rms are …nancially constrained, the investment cash-
‡ow sensitivity will in fact be higher for less constrained …rms (low ¿ …rms).
We depict the investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity predicted by this model in
…gure 2. The model delivers an “U-shaped” investment cash ‡ow sensitivity.
This is consistent with the non-monotonicity pointed out by Kaplan and
Zingales. The crucial di¤erence is that, contrary to their “anything goes”
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result, our model predicts a precise relationship between …nancial constraints
and investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. On the other hand, this relationship is
the opposite as the one postulated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988,
2000) and others. A progressive relaxation of …nancial constraints should
actually increase investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities, as long as …rms do not
become entirely unconstrained.
The intuition for this result is simple once we consider it in the context
of the discussion above. Consider …gure 3, which compares the impact of a
positive change in cash ‡ow for two …rms which di¤er only according to the
degree of capital market imperfections (measured by ¿):
The change in the availability of internal funds (¢W ) has a direct e¤ect
on constrained investment, which is the same for both …rms (and equal to
¢W ): However, there is also an indirect e¤ect which is due to the endogenous
increase in borrowing capacity for both …rms. For any increase in investment
¢I; borrowing capacity increases by (1¡ ¿)q1¢I for both …rms. Therefore,
this increase in borrowing capacity will be higher for the …rm with low ¿ ; the
less constrained …rm, whose debt capacity is more sensitive to a change in
cash ‡ow. It is this indirect ampli…cation e¤ect which drives the di¤erence
in investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities in our model.
2.1 Credit constraints versus price e¤ects. Why is our
result di¤erent?
This raises a natural question. Why is our result so di¤erent than the ones
stressed in the recent theoretical literature about …nancial constraints and
investment ? As we will show here, the main reason for that is our focus on
quantities, vis-a-vis the focus on costs used in previous literature.
Let us …rst summarize the main results in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(2000), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000). In the context of the discus-
sion, it will be easy to understand what is special about our results.
2.1.1 The current theoretical debate
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that there is nothing we can say a priori
about …nancial constraints and investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities, apart from
the obvious result that unconstrained …rms have zero, and constrained …rms
have positive, sensitivities.
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The essence of their model (which we call KZ model from now on), can be
summarized in …gures 4 and 5. Firms have an amount of internal funds equal
toW; and a production technology F (I) which satis…es ordinary assumptions.
Any amount of external funds raised by …rms entails deadweight costs equal
to C(I ¡W;k): The parameter k can be interpreted as a measure of a …rm’s
wedge between internal and external costs of funds. It is the counterpart
of the parameter ¿ above. Any amount of external funds that …rms raise
generates (because of information or agency problems) deadweight cost equal
to C(I ¡W; k); which will be higher the higher is the parameter k:
Given this set up, the equilibrium amount of investment (depicted in
…gure 4) is given by:
F
0
(I) = 1 + CE[I ¡W;k] (3)
Kaplan and Zingales also measure the sensitivity of investment to cash
‡ow as the derivative @I
@W
(W; k): The empirical approach pioneered by Faz-
zari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) consists of measuring the degree of …-
nancial constraints faced by di¤erence …rms as di¤erences in W or k; and
then looking at the cross-sectional di¤erences in @I
@W
: As depicted in …gure 5
(the counterpart of …gure 3 above), this consists of comparing the impact of
similar changes in W on the investment of two di¤erent …rms (indexed by k
in the …gure).
The problem pointed out by Kaplan and Zingales is that neither @
2I
@W@k
; nor
@2I
@W2
have a well de…ned sign. The most we can say is that an unconstrained
…rm (W very high6, or k equal to zero) has sensitivity equal to zero, while a
constrained …rm (a …rm which faces positive C(:)) has positive @I
@W
; at least
if CEE(:) is greater than zero.
This result generated a debate between Fazzari Hubbard and Petersen
(FHP 2000), and Kaplan and Zingales (KZ 2000). FHP (2000) also start
from the KZ model, and basically argue that the relevant source of …rm
heterogeneity in the empirical studies is the slope of the marginal cost curve
CE; and that once we take that into account the ambiguity stressed by Kaplan
6More precisely, the condition is that W is higher than the unconstrained investment
level, which can be de…ned by:
F 0(IFB) = 1
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and Zingales disappears. In terms of the KZ model, this is equivalent to the
assumption that:
CEEk[I ¡W; k] > 0 8 (I ¡W ) (4)
that is, …rms which face more severe capital market imperfections (high k
…rms) …nd it more expensive on the margin to increase the amount of external
…nance they raise, starting from any initial amount of external funds. In other
words, additional …nancing has a larger impact on the marginal cost schedule
if …rms are more …nancially constrained, as depicted in …gures 4 and 5.
FHP (2000) argue that condition 4 is su¢cient to yield @I
@W@k
> 0: Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case, as shown in KZ (2000). If the FHP condition 4
holds, …rms with higher k will …nd it more expensive to borrow funds in order
to smooth out the ‡uctuation in cash ‡ow. This will push in the direction of
a higher decrease in investment for the more constrained …rm. On the other
hand, as FHP point out themselves, CE tends to be convex, since marginal
agency costs of debt tend to increase with leverage7. But if CEEE > 0; then
less constrained …rms (low k …rms) are pushed into a range where marginal
costs of external …nance are more sensitive to further changes in external
funds. This is because such …rms always invest and borrow more in equilib-
rium, as compared to more constrained …rms. The negative shock to cash
‡ow will then have a larger impact for this group of …rms.
If the marginal productivity of investment is not linear, then we can have
a similar e¤ect associated with the slope of the demand for funds. If F
000
(:)
< 0; then less constrained …rms (those which have higher investment) will
be in a range where a similar change in the supply of funds will have a
higher e¤ect on equilibrium investment, since the slope of the demand for
investment has a more negative slope for these …rms.
In other words, given that we cannot expect both the marginal cost
CE and the marginal productivity of investment F 0(I) to be always linear,
investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities and …nancial constraints can bear almost
any shape. In our view, this is the main conclusion to take from this debate.
2.1.2 Why is our result di¤erent ?
A key assumption which is common to Kaplan and Zingales and Fazzari, Hub-
bard and Petersen is that …rms which face agency or information problems
7See also Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995).
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cannot raise any amount of external funds at the “right” cost (the oppor-
tunity cost of internal funds). Financial constraints in this world translate
entirely into higher costs of external funds (and costs which are more sensitive
to changes in the amount of external funds).
On the other hand, in the model we described in section 2, …nancial
constraints translate into a quantity constraint on the amount of funds which
can be raised at a given cost. However, the extent to which di¤erent …rms
can do this is limited by a borrowing constraint. This is the key reason why
we are able to derive precise empirical implications from our model.
Notice that, in the world we describe in section 2, none of the e¤ects
which drive sensitivities in the Kaplan and Zingales model matter. First
of all, notice in …gure 3 that the slope of the capital supply curve is the
same, in equilibrium, for both …rms. In equilibrium, all constrained …rms
are at the point at which the supply of capital becomes inelastic. Therefore,
the e¤ects related to changes in the slope of the supply of capital do not
matter. Furthermore, in any constrained equilibrium, the slope of the capital
demand curve does not matter, since it is not equal on the margin to the
slope of the supply curve (again, see …gure 3). Thus, the third derivative of
the production function does not in‡uence investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities.
Thus, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are entirely driven by the fact
that the change in borrowing capacity associated with a change in cash ‡ow
will be higher for the …rm with low ¿ ; the less constrained …rm (our indirect
ampli…cation e¤ect). And this e¤ect operates in the opposite direction as the
direction assumed in most of the empirical literature. Less constrained …rms
should in fact be more sensitive to changes in cash ‡ow.
3 Credit constraints and price e¤ects together
- the general case
In a sense, both Kaplan and Zingales and the model in section 2 describe two
extreme worlds. If all borrowing is subject to deadweight costs associated
with capital market imperfections, the Kaplan and Zingales model applies.
In general, implications for investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are ambiguous
in this world. If …rms can raise di¤erent amounts of external …nance at
the right cost, then the model in section 2 suggests that the function relat-
ing investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities and capital market imperfections has
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a well de…ned U-shape. As …nancial constraints are progressively relaxed,
investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities increase unambiguously until …rms become
unconstrained. Then, sensitivities decrease to zero.
It is clearly desirable from a theoretical perspective to bring together
the e¤ects of borrowing constraints, and the e¤ects of deadweight costs of
external …nance. In this section, we describe a simple model which nests KZ
and the model in section 2 as special cases.
Not surprisingly, the implications of this model for investment-cash ‡ow
sensitivities will depend on all the e¤ects described above for the two models
separately. Furthermore, if the parameters ¿ and k are positively correlated
(that is, …rms which have high debt capacity also face lower marginal costs
of external …nance), a novel interaction term arises. Let us turn now to the
model.
3.1 A general model
The following model brings together the features of KZ and the model in
section 2. The basic idea in the model is that …rms can raise a certain amount
of collateralized debt at the same opportunity costs of internal funds. Debt
capacity is then measured as the liquidity of the …rm’s assets, as in section
2. The novel feature here is that we allow …rms to raise external …nance in
excess of the value of their collateral. As in KZ, this will entail deadweight
costs which will be captured by a certain function C(:):
More formally, if we let D be the total amount of external …nance raised
by …rms, we have:
D = B + E
where B is the amount of collateralized debt, and E is the amount of un-
collateralized external …nance raised by …rms. As in KZ, deadweight costs
will be given by C(E; k): As in section 2, there is a constraint on the total
amount of collateralized debt …rms can raise:
B · (1¡ ¿ )q1I
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In this world, entrepreneurs will solve the following problem:
max (c0 + c1) s:t: (5)
c0 = W ¡ I +B + E ¸ 0
c1 = f(I) + q1I ¡B ¡ (E + C(E; k))
B · (1¡ ¿ )q1I
It is easy to see that, if ¿ = 1 we are back to the Kaplan and Zingales
model. If there is no uncollateralized borrowing (E = 0); we are back to the
model described in section 2. Thus, this model nests both KZ and the model
in section 2.
As in the previous section, the unconstrained investment level will obtain
as log as:
W + (1¡ ¿ )q1IFB ¸ IFB
Otherwise, …rms exhaust their collateralizable debt capacity and will also
raise uncollateralized external …nance. In such a case, program 5 can be
rewritten as:
max
I
F (I)¡ I ¡ C[q(¿ )I ¡W;k]
where F (I) = f(I) + q1I and:
q(¿ ) = 1¡ (1¡ ¿)q1
Notice that (1 ¡ q1) · q(¿ ) · 1; and q0(¿) > 0: As long as ¿ < 1; …rms
can borrow (1 ¡ ¿ )q1 times the investment level, and thus they can invest
more than W; without generating any deadweight costs of external …nance.
The …rst order condition is:
F
0
(I) = 1 + q(¿)CE[q(¿ )I ¡W;k]
Figure 6 depicts the optimal investment level in this model. The key
feature to notice here is that, if ¿ < 1 (so q(¿ ) < 1), the slope of the capital
supply function becomes less steep, irrespective of k: This is because an in-
crease in uncollateralized external …nance which is channeled into investment
will also enable the …rm to raise more collateralized debt. Thus, the marginal
costs of uncollateralized funds are e¤ectively lower than in the KZ model.
14
Now, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity is given by:
@I
@W
= ¡ CEE[q(¿ )I ¡W; k]
F "(I)¡ q(¿)2CEE[q(¿ )I ¡W;k] ; if I < I
FB
= 0; if I = IFB
The implications for investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity will depend on the
correlation between the parameters ¿ and k: The most reasonable case is one
in which they are positively correlated. This means that …rms which have
high debt capacity also have lower deadweight costs of uncollateralized funds.
This can be formalized by assuming that ¿ = k: The impact of the degree of
capital market imperfections on investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities can then
be measured by the derivative @I
@W@¿
; which can be shown to have the same
sign as the expression:
¡2q(¿ )q0(¿ )¡ F 00CEEEq0(¿ )I ¡ F 00CEE¿ ¡ @I
@¿
[F
00
CEEEq(¿ )I ¡ CEEF 000 ]
The last three terms are the ones discussed in KZ (2000), and FHP (2000).
If CEE¿ ; additional uncollateralized …nancing has a larger impact on the
marginal cost schedule if …rms face stronger capital market imperfections. A
shock to cash ‡ow will then have a larger impact on such …rms. If CEEE > 0;
then less constrained (low ¿) …rms are pushed into a range where marginal
costs of external …nance are more sensitive to further changes in external
funds. The negative shock to cash ‡ow will then have a larger impact for
this group of …rms. Finally, if F
000
(:) is higher (lower) than zero; then more
(less) constrained …rms will be in a range where a similar change in the supply
of funds will have a higher e¤ect on equilibrium investment.
The …rst term (always negative) is the one emphasized in section 2. If
…rms have high (collateralized) debt capacity (low ¿ ); then the change in bor-
rowing capacity induced by ¢W will be higher for such …rms. This indirect
ampli…cation e¤ect always pushes in the direction of higher investment-cash
‡ow sensitivities for less constrained …rms.
Finally, the second term arises from the interaction between collateralized
and uncollateralized borrowing. Let us assume that CEEE > 0; which is the
most reasonable case as we saw above. This means that the second term
is positive, pushing towards higher sensitivities for more constrained …rms.
This is due to the e¤ect of changes in ¿ in the capital supply curve. As we
15
saw in …gure 6, a decrease in the liquidity of assets (increase in ¿ ) tends to
shift the capital supply curve up and to the left. This moves a constrained
…rm to a range the supply curve is steeper, if CEEE > 0: Thus, marginal costs
of uncollateralized …nance are more sensitive to further changes in external
funds for such …rms.
Thus, when we consider both collateralized and uncollateralized borrow-
ing together in the same model, we are basically back to the ambiguous world
of the Kaplan and Zingales model. Not only do we bring back the ambiguous
e¤ects present in the KZ model, but we also add another e¤ect which arises
from the interaction between collateralized and uncollateralized borrowing.
4 Empirical and policy implications
In general, the function relating investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities to the de-
gree of …nancial constraints can have any shape, as shown in the previous
section. However, our analysis also points to some special cases when it will
be possible to make speci…c predictions about sensitivities.
4.1 Credit constraints and investment-cash ‡ow sensi-
tivities
The most clear case is when …rms are credit constrained, and di¤erences in
capital market imperfections change the degree of rationing. In this case, we
get a U-shaped relationship between …nancial constraints and investment-
cash ‡ow sensitivities. As …nancial constraints are progressively relaxed,
sensitivities always increase. If …rms become unconstrained, sensitivities de-
crease to zero.
Two important empirical properties of the investment-cash ‡ow sensitiv-
ity which come out of this model (see equation 2 above) are as follows. First,
sensitivities do not depend directly on the availability of internal funds. In-
ternal funds will only in‡uence whether a particular …rm is constrained or
not. Thus, we can test the prediction that sensitivities are increasing in
the degree of …nancial constraints, across a group of …rms which are a priori
classi…ed as …nancially constrained, without controlling for variables like cash
stocks. Second, sensitivities are not a¤ected by the endogeneity of …nancial
policy, that is, by the e¤ect of capital market imperfections on the level of
investment and external …nance. The U-shape implication is therefore robust
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to heterogeneity in the availability of internal funds, and to the endogeneity
of …nancial policy.
This analysis suggests a theoretically consistent way to identify the im-
pact of …nancial constraints on investment behavior, at least under certain
conditions. Basically, all we need is to isolate a situation when …nancial con-
straints a¤ect primarily credit constraints on …rms. If this is the case, then
investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are indeed empirically useful measures of
…nancial constraints.
From the perspective of previous empirical literature, the bad news is
that our prediction about the relationship between …nancial constraints and
sensitivities is the opposite as the one explored in previous empirical litera-
ture. Thus, our results cannot be used to rescue the investment-cash ‡ow
literature from the Kaplan and Zingales critique.
The empirical approach suggested by the current paper has already been
shown to be useful, although in a slightly di¤erent context. One good ex-
ample of the particular …nancing and investment decisions described in the
model of section 2 is on housing …nance contracts. The availability of mort-
gage credit to households is usually limited to a speci…c fraction of the value
of the house being purchased (the maximum loan-to-value ratio), which is
used as collateral. That is, credit rationing seems to be a crucial feature
of such contracts. Furthermore, housing …nance development di¤ers widely
across the world, and this has a direct e¤ect on observed maximum LTV
ratios in di¤erent countries.
Almeida (2000) builds a model which suggests that housing demand and
house prices should be more sensitive to shocks which a¤ect household in-
come, in countries where household …nance is more developed, as long as
…nancial development is not so high that households become unconstrained
(the U-shape above). This result arises precisely from the ampli…cation ef-
fects described here in section 2. He also tests this prediction using in-
ternational data on house prices, and obtains a result which is consistent
with the empirical prediction above. This is strong evidence that relaxation
of credit constraints tends to increase the extent to which investment and
prices respond to shocks to net worth. Thus, in these circumstances …nan-
cial constraints are important, but in a di¤erent way than the one suggested
by previous literature.
The di¤erence in empirical predictions has an interesting policy counter-
part. The process of …nancial development should be correlated with the
relaxation of credit constraints, since it tends to increases the amount of ex-
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ternal …nance agents can raise at the right cost. Thus, our paper suggests
that …nancial development could lead to higher ‡uctuations in investment
(and prices). Even if …nancial development is desirable for other reasons, the
potential associated increase in the extent of ‡uctuations could become an
explicit policy concern.
4.2 Implications from the general model
The analysis in section 3 shows that, if we bring together quantity constraints
and e¤ects of …nancial constraints on the cost of external funds, we will again
derive ambiguous implications for investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities. The
world described in section 3 is a world in which there is a “pecking order” in
the use of external …nance. Firms exhaust their collateralized debt capacity
…rst, because it is the cheapest way they can raise external funds. Then,
they raise the balance at higher costs. Both the amount they can raise at the
cheaper price, and the marginal costs of increasing funds above this limit,
are a¤ected by the degree of …nancial constraints.
It is no longer the case that investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities have the U-
shape described in section 2, because we bring back the e¤ects of changes in
the cost of non-rationed funds into the picture. This is true even if marginal
costs and the marginal productivity of investment are linear, or if we control
for the endogeneity of …nancial policy.
In the linear case, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities will depend on the
trade-o¤ between the e¤ect of capital market imperfections on the slope
of marginal costs (the FHP e¤ect), and the e¤ect of imperfections on the
ampli…cation e¤ect emphasized by Almeida. This will still be the case, even
if we control for the endogeneity of …nancial policy.
Furthermore, if marginal costs of non-rationed funds are not linear, we
bring back the ambiguous e¤ects emphasized by KZ (which we can take care
of by controlling for the endogeneity of …nancial policy), and an extra interac-
tion e¤ect (which we cannot handle). As shown above, a tightening in credit
constraints shifts the capital supply curve up and to the left. This moves a
constrained …rm to a range the supply curve is steeper: Thus, marginal costs
of non-rationed …nance are more sensitive to further changes in external funds
for such …rms.
This suggests that it is crucial to determine if …nancial constraints af-
fect primarily credit constraints on …rms (that is, the availability of …nance
at a given cost), or the cost of external …nance to di¤erent …rms. Most of
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the previous literature has not attempted to compare the relative impor-
tance of di¤erential costs and liquidity constraints. One exception is Japelli
and Pagano (1989), in the context of household …nance. They argue that
the wedge between the borrowing rate in the mortgage market, and an ap-
propriate lending rate does not appear to be a viable explanation of the
cross-country di¤erences in the …nancial liabilities of households. Di¤erences
among the interest rate wedges seem negligible, and there is no clear rela-
tion between lending volumes and wedges. On the other hand, cross-country
di¤erences in liquidity constraints on households seem to have a very strong
e¤ect on household balance sheets. This is consistent with the focus on
quantities that we propose in this paper.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
The main point of this paper is that, when …nancial constraints translate into
a quantity constraint on the amount of external funds which can be raised at a
given cost (credit constraint), we can get precise implications for investment-
cash ‡ow sensitivities. However, the implication is not that investment-
cash ‡ow sensitivities increase in the degree of …nancial constraints. The
implication of the model is that sensitivities should decrease with …nancial
constraints, as long as …rms are not entirely unconstrained. We get therefore
a “U-shaped” curve for the relationship between sensitivities and the measure
of …nancial constraints.
From an empirical perspective, our analysis brings both positive and neg-
ative contributions. The positive one is that we suggest a theoretically con-
sistent way to identify the impact of …nancial constraints on investment be-
havior, at least under certain conditions. If if …nancial constraints a¤ect
primarily credit constraints on …rms, investment-cash ‡ow sensitivities are
useful measures of …nancial constraints. The bad news is that our prediction
about the relationship between …nancial constraints and sensitivities is the
opposite as the one explored in previous empirical literature. Thus, our re-
sults cannot be used to rescue the investment-cash ‡ow literature from the
Kaplan and Zingales critique.
Existing empirical evidence (Almeida, 2000) already indicates that the
e¤ects we emphasize, and the approach we propose are relevant and useful.
However, this evidence is for housing markets and housing …nance. The
natural extension is empirical work in the context of …rm investment as well.
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Our results suggest that it is crucial to determine if …nancial constraints
a¤ect primarily credit constraints on …rms (that is, the availability of …nance
at a given cost), or the cost of external …nance to di¤erent …rms. On the other
hand, more work is clearly warranted on the issue of joint e¤ects of …nancial
constraints. The model we worked with (just like KZ) is not derived from …rst
principles, unlike the model in section 2. Perhaps a more precisely speci…ed
model can yield tighter predictions.
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Figure 1- Equilibrium investment
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Figure 2 - Investment-cash flow sensitivity and
financial constraints
 τ
∂I / ∂W
1τmin
Figure 3 -Negative cash-flow shock
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Figure 4 - Equilibrium investment in the KZ model
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Figure 5 - Negative cash-flow shock in the KZ
model
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Figure 6 - Equilibrium investment in general case
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